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Abstract 
Recent reviews of the information technology outsourcing (ITO) literature report high variance in 
research results when Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is used as the analytical framework. Informed 
by ITO market developments, including increasing commoditisation, market consolidation, and market 
transparency, we develop an explanation for these mixed results contingent on ITO industry maturity. 
We adopt meta-analysis to show that ITO industry maturity significantly explains variance in the choice 
of contract type (time and materials vs. fixed price) in ITO projects. Our results suggest that TCE is 
relevant to explain the choice of contract type in the emerging phase of the ITO industry, but not in its 
current mature phase. We conclude that a TCE-based analytical framework is not well suited for the 
study of ITO in the current mature industry phase. Instead, we propose that an “endogenous” ITO 
theory should be developed that focuses on differences in client behaviour rather than vendor behaviour. 
Keywords: Transaction Cost Economics, IT outsourcing, Industry maturity, Meta-analysis, Contract 
type 
 
1 Introduction 
Starting in the 1990s, information technology outsourcing (ITO) has developed into a well-established 
global industry with an estimated market volume of US$ 287 billion in 2013 (Gartner, 2013). Following 
Grover et al. (1996), we define ITO as “a service provided by an external vendor that could involve 
various facets of a firm’s IT development, operations, and management” (p. 93). This definition 
includes, for example, software development, IT infrastructure, and software-as-a-service outsourcing. 
ITO services are becoming standardised and modularised, allowing ITO vendors to realise economies 
of scale (Manning, 2013). At the same time, the ITO industry has become increasingly consolidated and 
competitive (Manning et al., 2011). ITO clients are becoming more informed due to increased market 
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transparency contingent on the standardisation of ITO services and consolidation in the ITO market 
(Reimann et al., 2010). 
Critical ITO decisions in both theory and practice include the decision to make or buy (e.g., Watjatrakul, 
2005), the degree of outsourcing (e.g., Aubert et al., 2004), and ITO management decisions, for example, 
choice of contract type (e.g., Susarla et al., 2009) and trade-offs between relational and formal 
governance (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Across this literature, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), 
in which the transaction is the unit of analysis (Williamson, 1979; Williamson, 1985), is the dominant 
analytical framework (Dibbern et al., 2004; Karimi-Alaghehband et al., 2011; Klein, 2002; Lacity et al., 
2011). 
However, the empirical findings reported in the ITO literature do not strongly support the TCE logic. 
Instead, there is high variance in effect sizes and even in the direction of those effects (Karimi-
Alaghehband et al., 2011; Lacity et al., 2011). Reviewing ITO studies on the decision to outsource and 
related outcomes, Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) report that 44% of TCE-based hypotheses were not 
supported. In a similar literature analysis, Lacity et al. (2011) find that 51% of the TCE-based 
hypotheses, explaining a wide variety of ITO decisions and outcomes, are not supported. 
Two different explanations are proposed for these empirical findings. One is methodological. Karimi-
Alaghehband et al. (2011) argue that measurement errors and construct validity threats explain the 
variance in findings. The other explanation is theoretical. Lacity et al. (2011) conclude that the variance 
in findings is the result of an uncritical and inappropriate adoption of the TCE framework. 
In this paper, we propose and investigate a third explanation, which combines elements from both 
Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) and Lacity et al. (2011). The argument has two components. One is 
that, in the strategic management literature, Argyres and Bigelow (2007) argue that the applicability of 
TCE and, hence, the explanatory power of TCE, is a function of the maturity of an industry. 
The other component is the finding from the ITO literature that market developments, such as increasing 
commoditisation, consolidation, and market transparency, have changed the ITO industry (Manning, 
2013; Manning et al., 2011). Specifically, the ITO industry has changed from an emerging industry and 
became a mature industry (Bhatnagar and Madon, 1997; Stadtmann and Kreutter, 2009; Suarez et al., 
2013). Hence, the question guiding this research is: Does the maturity of the ITO industry explain the 
variance in TCE-based findings for the effect of uncertainty on the choice between fixed price contracts, 
and time and materials contracts? 
Meta-analysis is adopted to investigate this question. Specifically, we compare the explanatory power 
of the TCE analytical framework in the initial emerging phase compared with the more recent maturing 
phase of the ITO industry. To do this, we restrict the analysis to the choice of contract type, specifically, 
the choice between a time and materials (TM) contract and a fixed price (FP) contract. 
The choice of contract type was investigated because it satisfies three criteria. First, it is an important 
research issue. It has been the subject of a major research stream in the ITO literature (Fink et al., 2013; 
Gefen et al., 2008; Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008; Gopal et al., 2003; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004; 
Susarla et al., 2009). Second, for that reason, there is a sufficient number of studies to support a meta-
analysis. We identified 29 quantitative ITO studies that include an analysis of contract type. Third, the 
research question is a close fit to the basic assumptions of TCE. There is a specific governance decision, 
the choice of contract type, and the transaction costs are contingent on this choice. Therefore, a meta-
analysis of the choice of contract type provides a lens on the competing explanations of the variance in 
findings when adopting a TCE framework to research the ITO industry. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review the literature on how TCE 
explains the choice of contract type, and the effect of industry maturity on that choice. Section 3 
describes the meta-analysis methodology, including the literature search, coding of studies, and analysis. 
Section 4 presents the results and section 5 discusses those results, their limitations, and implications 
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for theory and practice. Section 6 presents the conclusions, highlighting the critical contribution from 
the research. 
2 Theoretical Background 
TCE models the choice of contract type as a problem of minimising transaction costs (Bajari and Tadelis, 
2001; Corts and Singh, 2004; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004). Assuming asymmetric information between 
the client and vendor, the choice is a trade-off between monitoring and renegotiation costs (Osei-Bryson 
and Ngwenyama, 2006; Susarla et al., 2009). Monitoring costs are lower under FP contracts than under 
TM contracts. In contrast, renegotiation costs are higher under FP contracts than under TM contracts. 
TCE predicts that the preference for TM over FP contracts is a positive function of task environmental 
uncertainty (TEU). 
As industries mature, TEU, client and vendor information asymmetry, and switching costs decline. Each 
of these changes reduces the observed strength of the relationship between choice of contract type and 
TEU in ITO. So, this relationship, which is predicted by TCE, becomes less important to the client as 
the ITO industry matures. Importantly, the validity of the general TCE theory is not affected. Rather, 
the theory is less relevant in the mature phase of the ITO industry. 
2.1 Transaction Cost Economics and Contract Type 
Monitoring costs are contingent on the resources that the client must expend to prevent the vendor from 
shirking. This refers to a vendor deliberately expending lower resources than specified in an ITO 
contract while claiming full payment under that contract. The risk of this behaviour occurring decreases 
as client knowledge of project costs and project performance increases (Aron et al., 2005). 
Renegotiation costs are incurred when the context changes during the project and the contract 
specifications must be renegotiated. These costs are a positive function of the risk that a vendor uses its 
private information about the true costs of the required changes to extract concessions from the client 
(Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Wathne and Heide, 2000). 
The decision between FP and TM contracts mitigates the risk of opportunistic vendor behaviour (Bajari 
and Tadelis, 2001; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004; Osei-Bryson and Ngwenyama, 2006; Susarla et al., 2009). 
Monitoring costs are lower under FP contracts than under TM contracts. In contrast, renegotiation costs 
are higher under the former than the latter. Therefore, choice of contract depends on the relative 
magnitudes of the transaction costs (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Susarla et al., 2009). 
In FP contracts, cost overruns negatively affect the project profitability for the vendor (Ethiraj et al., 
2005; Gopal and Koka, 2012; Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008; Gopal et al., 2003). Thus, FP 
contracts provide strong incentives for vendors to manage projects in a cost-efficient way (Bajari and 
Tadelis, 2001; Corts and Singh, 2004; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004). For example, vendors assign more 
trained personnel to FP compared with TM projects (Arora and Asundi, 1999; Gopal and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2008). 
In TM contracts, however, cost overruns are borne by the client. Thus, TM contracts do not provide 
strong incentives for vendors to control costs. Instead, coupled with information asymmetry, TM 
contracts motivate vendor opportunism in form of shirking (Osei-Bryson and Ngwenyama, 2006; 
Susarla et al., 2009). Under TM contracts, therefore, clients must monitor vendor behaviour and 
performance closely to reduce information asymmetries and prevent vendors from shirking (Osei-
Bryson and Ngwenyama, 2006; Susarla et al., 2009). 
Renegotiation costs are higher under FP contracts compared with TM contracts (Bajari and Tadelis, 
2001; Corts and Singh, 2004; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004). Typically, FP contracts include detailed project 
plans, including functional requirements, service levels, and costs (Fink et al., 2013). When unforeseen 
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contingencies arise, project specifications must be renegotiated (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). Therefore, 
coupled with information asymmetry, FP contracts provide both the opportunity and motivation for 
vendor opportunism in the form of extracting concessions from the client (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; 
Wathne and Heide, 2000). 
With vendors remunerated on the basis of reported working hours or days, TM contracts are more 
coarse-grained, allowing for adjustments during the course of the project (Fink et al., 2013). So, vendors 
under TM contracts, compared with vendors under FP contracts, are more willing to accept changes 
without the need for costly renegotiations (Kalnins and Mayer, 2004; Susarla et al., 2009). 
Drawing on the above arguments, the ITO literature models the choice between FP contracts and TM 
contracts as a function of TEU, a core variable in the TCE framework (e.g., Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; 
Fink et al., 2013; Gopal et al., 2003; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004; Susarla et al., 2009). When the presence 
of unforeseen contingencies is expected to be high, the flexibility provided by TM contracts outweighs 
the incentives under FP contracts to control transaction costs (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Susarla et al., 
2009). In addition, high TEU makes it difficult to draft a detailed FP contract ex-ante that could be used 
as the basis for evaluating the project ex-post (Crocker and Reynolds, 1993). Formally, within a TCE 
framework: 
Hypothesis 1: In ITO, the frequency with which TM contracts are chosen instead of FP contracts is a 
positive function of TEU. 
2.2 Industry Maturity 
There are two potential moderators to the research findings supporting Hypothesis 1. One is that the 
information asymmetry between client and vendor is not stable and declines as the ITO industry matures. 
The other is that TEU is not stable and also declines as the ITO industry matures. 
The ITO industry has changed since the early 1990s from an emerging to a maturing industry (Bhatnagar 
and Madon, 1997; Manning et al., 2011; Stadtmann and Kreutter, 2009; Suarez et al., 2013). This 
development is partly a function of the increasing commoditisation of the ITO industry. 
Commoditisation has been achieved through service modularisation, service standardisation, and the 
decoupling of ITO services from particular projects and clients (Manning, 2013). Recent surveys 
conducted by the Offshoring Research Network report that 42% of the respondents considered ITO 
services to be highly commoditised in 2007, increasing to over 50% in 2009, and reaching 71% in 
2011/12 (Manning, 2013). 
Commoditisation reduces TEU by reducing the variety in ITO service offerings and by fostering the 
emergence of standards and benchmarks. As a consequence, there is a reduction in the variance in the 
independent variable, TEU. This reduces the strength of the observed relationship between choice of 
contract type and TEU.  
Commoditisation also stimulates cost-based competition, which increases the pressure for further 
market consolidation within the ITO industry (Manning et al., 2011). Both commoditised services and 
market consolidation increase market transparency and lead to better informed clients (Reimann et al., 
2010). Effectively, this reduces the information asymmetry between the client and the vendor, reducing 
the strength of the observed relationship between TEU and the choice of contract type.  
For example, TCE predicts that there is a risk of shirking when clients have limited information about 
the task. The emergence of standards and benchmarks in commoditised industries increases client task 
knowledge and, thus, reduces the risk of shirking (Davenport, 2005; Manning et al., 2011). Similar 
arguments apply to the mitigation of vendor opportunism to extract concessions from clients. 
The mitigating effect of increased market transparency on vendor opportunism in ITO projects is 
reinforced by the importance of vendor reputation in commoditised industries. Standardisation and 
modularisation of ITO services decrease switching costs for clients (Reimann et al., 2010) and decrease 
Dongus et al. /TCE and ITO Industry Maturity 
 
 
Twenty Second European Conference on Information Systems, Tel Aviv 2014                                         5 
 
 
vendor propensity to behave opportunistically. This would reduce the observed relationship between 
choice of contract type and TEU. Formally: 
Hypothesis 2: The strength of the relationship between TEU and the frequency with which TM contracts 
are chosen instead of FP contracts is a negative function of ITO industry maturity. 
3 Methodology 
We investigated these hypotheses using meta-analysis, which is a suite of quantitative techniques to 
synthesise research findings across multiple studies (Glass, 1976; Hedges and Olkin, 1985; Hunter and 
Schmidt, 1990; Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). The input data are effect sizes, specifically correlation 
coefficients from individual studies addressing the same relationship of interest (Lipsey and Wilson, 
2001). Utilising the total sample size by aggregating across the individual studies, meta-analyses enable 
researchers to estimate more reliable effect sizes than traditional review procedures such as narrative 
reviews or vote-counting approaches (Glass et al., 1981; Hunter and Schmidt, 1990; Hunter and 
Schmidt, 2004; Rosenthal and DiMatteo, 2001). 
Meta-analysis is a widely accepted methodology in related research domains including marketing, 
management, and psychology. Recently, it is increasingly being adopted in information systems (IS) 
research (see, e.g., He and King, 2008; Joseph et al., 2007; Sabherwal et al., 2006; Sharma and Yetton, 
2003; Sharma and Yetton, 2007; Sharma et al., 2009; Wu and Lederer, 2009). Here, we describe the 
process of our meta-analysis under three headings: literature search, coding, and analysis. 
3.1 Literature Search 
Our sample consists of empirical studies reported in journals, conference proceedings, dissertations, 
working papers, and forthcoming journal papers. We included conference papers, dissertations, and 
working papers to address the “file-drawer problem”. This refers to the issue that published studies may 
systematically overestimate effect sizes compared to unpublished studies (Rosenthal, 1979). 
Following the recommendations by Cooper (2010) and recent meta-analyses in IS (Sharma and Yetton, 
2003; Sharma and Yetton, 2007; Wu and Lederer, 2009), we conducted four complementary literature 
searches. This minimised the probability of failing to identify relevant studies. First, we conducted a 
systematic keyword search in the following databases1: Business Source Premier, JSTOR, 
ScienceDirect, ABI/INFORM, ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, The Association for Information 
Systems Electronic Library (AISeL), ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, and WorldCat Dissertations 
and Theses2. Second, we conducted backward and forward searches (Webster and Watson, 2002). Third, 
we searched for working papers and forthcoming journal papers by screening the websites of key authors 
identified in the previous steps, conducting keyword searches in Google, and searching the Social 
Science Research Network (SSRN). Fourth, we sent requests for unpublished working papers using 
several mailing lists (e.g., AISworld and AOM OCIS). 
                                                     
1 Following Sabherwal et al. (2006) we used one or more of several keywords related to IS outsourcing projects (i.e. “software”, “information 
system”, “information technology”, “outsourcing”) and one or more of several keywords related to contract type (i.e., “contract”, “fixed price”, 
“time and materials”, “cost plus”) and their variants (e.g., “fixed-price”). 
2 These databases included the major journals and conference proceedings in the IS and management discipline such as Management 
Information Systems Quarterly (MISQ), Information Systems Research (ISR), Journal of Management Information Systems (JMIS), 
Management Science (MS), Academy of Management Journal (AMJ), Strategic Management Journal (SMJ), International Conference on 
Information Systems (ICIS), Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS), European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), 
and Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS). 
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A study is included in the meta-analysis if it satisfies three criteria. First, the study investigates ITO 
projects as its unit of analysis. Second, the study measures contract type and TEU. Third, the study 
reports the sample size and the correlation coefficients between contract type and TEU3. 
The resultant meta-analysis sample includes 29 studies based on 23 independent samples4 providing 94 
effect sizes representing a total sample size of 6,343 ITO projects5,6. 
3.2 Coding 
For each study included in the meta-analysis, the following information was extracted: name and 
description of each variable that relates to TEU, the correlation coefficient between contract type and 
each variable, the measurement error for contract type and each variable in terms of reliability 
coefficients, the sample size, and the mean year of the data sample. Based on this information, we coded 
the dependent variable (contract type), the independent variable (TEU), and the moderating variable 
(ITO industry maturity) for each study. 
Coding of the dependent variable 
Many of the studies included in the meta-analysis operationalise contract type as a binary variable that 
distinguishes FP contracts and TM contracts. We converted the correlation coefficients, so that higher 
value of the contract type variables corresponds to a TM contract and lower value corresponds to a FP 
contract. 
Coding of the independent variable 
Frequently, TCE-based research operationalises TEU with variables that relate to particular aspects of 
TEU, such as requirements uncertainty and technological uncertainty, or variables that are highly 
interrelated with TEU, such as technological complexity, organisational complexity, and project size 
(Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Crocker and Reynolds, 1993; Fink et al., 2013; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004). 
Accordingly, we coded all those variables as TEU. This involved judgment by the coders (Heugens and 
Lander, 2009). To minimise coding errors, we adopted the protocol recommended by Lipsey and Wilson 
(2001). The coding protocol is available from the corresponding author on request. It is not reported 
here because of the page restriction on this paper. Two coders independently coded each study. Cohen’s 
(1960) kappa is 0.94, demonstrating high inter-coder reliability. Disagreements between the coders were 
resolved through discussion. 
When a study contained more than one variable related to TEU (e.g., a study includes a variable related 
to project size and a variable related to requirements uncertainty), we averaged the corresponding effect 
sizes (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004; Palmatier et al., 2006). This avoids biased estimates that would result 
from including dependent effect sizes in a meta-analysis (e.g., He and King, 2008; Palmatier et al., 
2006). In total, 94 initial effect sizes were combined to 23 independent effect sizes. 
Coding of the moderating variable 
The moderating variable, ITO industry maturity, was coded as a binary variable. This is consistent with 
the practice in the strategic management literature on industry maturity, which distinguishes between an 
                                                     
3 When these statistics were missing, we contacted the corresponding author of the study with a request to share the missing statistics with us. 
This lead to an inclusion of three additional studies providing 10 effect sizes. 
4 Multiple studies based on the same sample were included only where each of these studies reports at least one operationalisation of TEU that 
is not reported in the others. In this case, operationalisations of TEU that are reported in more than one of these studies were considered only 
once. Priority was given to the study based on the largest sample size. 
5 Represented in the references section by asterisks.  
6 Distributed across publication type as follows: Journals (21), conference proceedings (4), dissertations (1), and working papers (3). Distributed 
across years as follows: 2000 (1), 2001 (0), 2002 (0), 2003 (0), 2004 (1), 2005 (1), 2006 (0), 2007 (2), 2008 (3), 2009 (4), 2010 (4), 2011 (4), 
and 2012 (9). Journals and conference proceedings providing the most studies: JMIS (4), MISQ (3), SMJ (3), and ICIS (3). 
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early (emerging) and a later (mature) phase of an industry (see, e.g., Agarwal et al., 2002; Suarez et al., 
2013). These two phases are separated by a point in time – the onset of maturity (Suarez et al., 2013). 
In a study of software-as-a-service outsourcing, Susarla and Barua (2011) identified the year 2001 as 
the onset of maturity in the ITO industry. Accordingly, we adopted the same year to partition the 
emerging from the mature phase of the ITO industry. 
For each study included in the meta-analysis, we calculated the mean year of the data sample (i.e., the 
mean of the years in which the ITO projects were conducted). If the mean year of the data sample was 
later than 2001, industry maturity was coded as “high” (mature phase). Otherwise, industry maturity 
was coded as “low” (emerging phase). 
3.3 Analysis 
The analysis is presented in three stages. First, to test Hypothesis 1, the main effect of TEU on contract 
type is estimated. Second, to test Hypothesis 2, the moderating effect of industry maturity on the 
relationship between TEU and contract type is analysed. Third, a robustness check is conducted to 
control our results for varying operationalisations of TEU. 
Main Effect 
The unit of analysis is a zero-order, Pearson product-moment-correlation coefficient. It is a well 
understood, scale-free measure of the relationship between two variables (Rosenthal and DiMatteo, 
2001). The Fisher z transformation was not adopted. It introduces an expected positive bias, which is 
larger than the expected negative bias when using untransformed correlation coefficients (Hall and 
Brannik, 2002; Hunter and Schmidt, 2004).  
The correlation coefficients were corrected for measurement error (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). 
Specifically, each correlation coefficient was divided by the product of the square root of the reliability 
coefficients for contract type and the TEU variable. If a measurement was based on a single-item or a 
proxy variable, we adopted a conservative standard of 0.8 for the reliability coefficient (Bommer et al., 
1995; Dalton et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 1999; Jiang et al., 2012; Sleesman et al., 
2010). 
Following recent meta-analyses in IS (e.g., Joseph et al., 2007; Sabherwal et al., 2006), the Hunter and 
Schmidt (2004) random effects model was adopted. Weighting the corrected correlation coefficients by 
sample size and reliability, the following meta-analytic outcomes were estimated: the number of effect 
sizes (𝑘), the total sample size (𝑁), the average corrected correlation (expected rho; ?̅?), the standard 
deviation of rho (𝑆𝐷𝜌), and the 95 percent confidence interval around the expected rho (𝐶𝐼?̅?;.95)
7. Positive 
values of the expected rho indicate that the frequency with which TM contracts are chosen instead of 
FP contracts is a positive function of TEU. Negative values of the expected rho indicate that the 
frequency with which TM contracts are chosen instead of FP contracts is a negative function of TEU. 
The relationship is statistically significant when the 95 percent confidence interval around the expected 
rho does not include zero. 
In addition, we calculated three meta-analytic outcomes to assess the generalisability of the results: the 
80 percent credibility interval around the expected rho (𝐶𝑅?̅?;.80), the percentage of variance that is 
accounted for by statistical artefacts (%𝑉), and Cochran’s (1954) chi-square statistic for heterogeneity 
(𝑄). We assessed generalisability as follows: In contrast to the confidence interval, which refers to the 
accuracy of a single estimate, the expected rho, the credibility interval refers to the distribution of the 
rho and is used to assess the generalisability of the expected rho (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). When the 
credibility interval is large or includes zero, the expected rho does not generalise (Whitener, 1990). 
                                                     
7 We used Hunter and Schmidt’s (2004) formula for individually corrected correlation coefficients to calculate the standard errror of the 
estimated average correlations: 𝑆𝐸?̅? = 𝑆𝐷𝑟/√𝑘. 
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Instead, the distribution of rho is assumed to be heterogeneous. Similarly, if less than 75 percent of the 
observed variance in the rho can be accounted for by statistical artefacts, Hunter and Schmidt (2004) 
suggest a relationship to be heterogeneous. When Cochran’s (1954) chi-square statistic is significant, 
the expected rho does not generalise. Instead, it should be interpreted as the expected value of a number 
of effects rather than a common true effect (Hedges and Olkin, 1985). 
Moderating Effect 
We use an ANOVA-based subgroup-analysis procedure (Borenstein et al., 2009) to analyse the 
moderating effect of industry maturity on the relationships between contract type and TEU. The studies 
included in the meta-analyses are partitioned into two ITO industry maturity subgroups: “low” 
(emerging phase) and “high” (mature phase).8 The meta-analytic outcomes described above are 
replicated for each subgroup. 
The procedure described by Borenstein et al. (2009) is based on a decomposition of Cochran’s (1954) 
chi-square statistic for heterogeneity (see, e.g., Park and Shaw, 2013). In the analysis reported here, a 
relationship with a significant 𝑄𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛-statistic is interpreted as showing that the effect size is 
contingent on industry maturity. Specifically, industry maturity moderates the effect of TEU on the 
choice of contract type. 
Robustness Check 
Previous research suggests that varying operationalisations of TCE’s core variables might cause mixed 
TCE results in ITO research (David and Han, 2004; Karimi-Alaghehband et al., 2011). Specifically, 
research highlighted the mixed results with varying operationalisations of uncertainty (Carter and 
Hodgsen, 2006). To control for variations between different operationalisations of TEU, we additionally 
conducted the meta-analytic calculations for each operationalisation of TEU separately. In this analysis, 
the 94 initial effect sizes were combined into 64 independent effect sizes. 
4 Results 
The results in Table 1 support Hypothesis 1: In ITO, the frequency with which TM contracts are chosen 
instead of FP contracts is a positive function of TEU. The 95 percent confidence interval does not 
include zero, supporting Hypothesis 1. However, the effect size (?̅? = .10) is small by conventional 
standards (Cohen, 1988). Across all three criteria to assess the generalisability of the relationships 
(𝐶𝑅?̅?;.80, %𝑉, 𝑄), Table 1 reports a significant degree of heterogeneity, indicating that the relationship 
is moderated by other variables. 
 
Relationship 𝒌 𝑵 ?̅? 𝑺𝑫𝝆 𝑪𝑰?̅?;.𝟗𝟓 𝑪𝑹?̅?;.𝟖𝟎 %𝑽 𝑸 
TEU → Contract type is TM 23 6,343 .10 .09 .05 : .14 –.02 : .21 0.40 56.32* 
𝑘: number of effect sizes; 𝑁: total sample size; ?̅?: expected rho; 𝑆𝐷𝜌: standard deviation of rho; 𝐶𝐼?̅?;.95: 95% confidence interval around the 
expected rho; 𝐶𝑅?̅?;.80: 80% credibility interval around the expected rho; 𝑄: Cochran’s chi-square statistic for heterogeneity; *: 𝑝-value of 𝑄 < 
0.05. 
Table 1. TEU and Contract Type 
Table 2 presents the meta-analytic results for the relationships between TEU and contract type, 
controlling for industry maturity.  The results support Hypothesis 2: The strength of the relationship 
between TEU and the frequency with which TM contracts are chosen instead of FP contracts is a 
negative function of ITO industry maturity. The 𝑄𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛-statistic is significant (𝑄𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 = 8.35*), 
supporting Hypothesis 2. In the emerging phase, the effect of TEU on TM contracts is larger (?̅? = .14) 
                                                     
8 We excluded one study from the subsample analysis because we were not able to obtain the mean year of the data sample for 
the study. 
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than in the mature phase (?̅? = .05). Furthermore, the effect of TEU on contract type is significant only 
in the emerging phase. In the mature phase, it is not significant (see the 95 percent confidence intervals). 
 
Relationship 𝒌 𝑵 ?̅? 𝑺𝑫𝝆 𝑪𝑰?̅?;.𝟗𝟓 𝑪𝑹?̅?;.𝟖𝟎 %𝑽 𝑸𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒏 
TEU → Contract type is TM (𝑄𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 = 8.35*) 
    Emerging phase 12 3,249 .14 .08 .08 : .20 .04 : .24 0.50 23.67* 
    Mature phase 10 2,999 .05 .09 –.02 : .12 –.06 : .16 0.41 24.17* 
𝑘: number of effect sizes; 𝑁: total sample size; ?̅?: expected rho; 𝑆𝐷𝜌: standard deviation of rho; 𝐶𝐼?̅?;.95: 95% confidence interval around the 
expected rho; 𝐶𝑅?̅?;.80: 80% credibility interval around the expected rho; 𝑄𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛: Cochran’s chi-square statistic for heterogeneity that is 
explained by the moderator variable;  𝑄𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛: Cochran’s chi-square statistic for heterogeneity that remains within the subsample; *: 𝑝-value 
of 𝑄 < 0.05. 
Table 2. TEU and Contract Type: Controlling for Industry Maturity 
Table 3 presents the meta-analytic results for the relationships between TEU and choice of contract type, 
controlling for both industry maturity and different operationalisations of TEU. In the emerging industry 
phase, estimating the relationship between TEU and choice of contract type, requirements uncertainty 
has the largest significant effect (?̅? = .23), organisational complexity the lowest significant effect (?̅? =
 .12), and technological complexity the lowest non-significant effect (?̅? = .05). So, contingent on the 
operationalisation of TEU, the effect of TEU on choice of contract type ranges from 0.05 to 0.23 in 
Table 3 with an expected value of 0.14. In contrast, in the mature phase, the effect of TEU on choice of 
contract type is not significant, regardless of how TEU is operationalised. 
 
Relationship 𝒌 𝑵 ?̅? 𝑺𝑫𝝆 𝑪𝑰?̅?;.𝟗𝟓 
TEU → Contract type is TM 
    Emerging phase 
       Technological uncertainty 2 559 .17 .15 –.06 : .40 
       Requirements uncertainty 4 793 .23 .15 .06 : .39 
       Technological complexity 10 2,986 .05 .06 –.01 : .11 
       Organisational complexity 6 1,826 .12 .08 .03 : .21 
       Project size 12 3,243 .20 .10 .13 : .27 
    Mature phase 
       Technological uncertainty 3 753 .05 .04 –.05 : .15 
       Requirements uncertainty 6 1,508 .08 .13 –.04 : .20 
       Technological complexity 5 1,434 .02 .11 –.09 : .13 
       Organisational complexity 8 2,803 –.06 .17 –.18 : .07 
       Project size 8 2,462 .10 .21 –.06 : .25 
𝑘: number of effect sizes; 𝑁: total sample size; ?̅?: expected rho; 𝑆𝐷𝜌: standard deviation of rho; 𝐶𝐼?̅?;.95: 95% confidence interval around the 
expected rho. 
Table 3. Effect Sizes for Different Measures of TEU 
5 Discussion 
The results in Table 1 show that TEU has a significant but small effect (?̅? = .10) on choice of contract 
type (Hypothesis 1). In addition, the results indicate heterogeneity in this relationship, which is indirect 
evidence for Hypothesis 2. 
Controlling for the effect of industry maturity, the results in Table 2 show that the effect of TEU on 
contract type is contingent on ITO industry maturity (Hypothesis 2). The relationship between choice 
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of contract type and TEU is stronger in the emerging phase than in the mature phase of the ITO industry. 
Specifically, the relationship is significantly positive in the emerging phase of the ITO industry and is 
non-significant in the mature phase. 
Controlling for the effects of both industry maturity and different operationalisations of TEU, the results 
in Table 3 show that, in the emerging industry phase, the relationship between TEU and choice of 
contract type is significant for three measures of TEU, namely, requirements uncertainty, organisational 
complexity, and project size (see the 95% confidence intervals in Table 3). In the mature phase, the 
relationship between TUE and choice of contract type is non-significant for all the measures of TEU 
(See Table 3). 
5.1 Limitations 
Meta-analysis is subject to a number of limitations. Five of the most frequently identified validity threats 
to meta-analysis findings are reviewed here. First, we were not able to identify and include all empirical 
research studies on contract type choice in ITO research. Although we conducted an extensive literature 
search, the possibility remains that we did not identify all the studies. Furthermore, some studies did not 
report the necessary statistics and, thus, are not included in the meta-analysis. However, considering the 
extensive nature of the search process, we are confident that any excluded studies would not 
substantially affect the results presented above. 
Second, estimates of the expected rhos, for example, in the robustness check, are based on a small 
number of effect sizes. Whereas a small number of effect sizes does not bias the estimates of the expected 
rhos, it does affect the estimate of the standard deviation of the rhos that are used to calculate the 
credibility intervals (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). We, therefore, additionally estimated Hunter and 
Schmidt’s (2004) 75 percent rule and Cochran’s (1954) chi-square test for heterogeneity. There is no 
evidence of bias in the findings presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3. 
Third, although the coding of TEU resulted in high inter-coder reliability, the process of designing the 
coding scheme itself involved some subjectivity. We were careful in designing the coding scheme: The 
variables were assigned to the operationalisations of TEU based on their explicit use in primary studies. 
However, when this was in doubt, the assignment was discussed and resolved between two of the 
authors. 
Fourth, we corrected our results only for the three statistical artefacts that are present in every individual 
study: sampling error, measurement error of TEU, and measurement error of contract type. Hunter and 
Schmidt (2004) describe procedures to correct for other statistical artefacts including range restriction 
and dichotomisation of continuous variables. However, information that must be extracted from the 
individual studies to correct for these artefacts is rarely available and is, thus, beyond the scope of this 
meta-analysis. 
The fifth threat is the file-drawer problem (Rosenthal, 1979). This refers to the potential bias that the 
results of unpublished studies differ systematically from the results of published studies. We searched 
extensively for conference papers, dissertations, and working papers to address this issue. Twenty eight 
percent of the studies included in the meta-analysis fall into these three categories. We are confident 
that the file-drawer problem is not a potential major validity threat to the results. 
5.2 Implications for Theory and Practice 
Two recent empirical reviews report mixed support for the TCE logic in ITO research. Approximately 
50% of the TCE-based hypotheses are not supported or are even contradicted in extant ITO research 
(Karimi-Alaghehband et al., 2011; Lacity et al., 2011). Our results support these findings. While the 
meta-analytic results in Table 1 report a small significant effect of TEU on choice of contract type, Table 
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1 also reports significant heterogeneity in that relationship. With a small main effect, the probability of 
a Type II error is high, accounting for the high frequency of non-significant findings. 
Partitioning the correlations used to compute the results in Table 1 between those that significantly 
support and do not significantly support the logic of TCE, 41% supported the logic of TCE and 59% did 
not support the logic of TCE (Table 4). These findings are similar to or slightly higher than those 
reported by Lacity et al. (2011) and Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011). So, the results reported here are 
unlikely to be specific to the research domain defined by the choice of contract type and are expected to 
generalise to other TCE-based hypotheses concerning ITO. Future research should confirm this. 
 
TEU → Contract type is TM 𝒌        TCE logic supported          TCE logic NOT supported 
    Emerging phase 12                  6 (50%)                        6 (50%) 
    Mature phase 10                  3 (30%)                        7 (70%) 
    Total 22                  9 (41%)                       13 (59%) 
𝑘: number of effect sizes. 
Table 4. The Relationship between TEU and Contract Type, and Industry Maturity 
Lacity et al. (2011) and Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) present different explanations for these mixed 
results. Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) argue that insufficient rigour, such as varying construct 
operationalisations, may have caused the mixed TCE-support in empirical ITO research. The results of 
our robustness check indicate that methodological rigour does indeed play an important role in 
explaining the mixed results in the emerging phase of the ITO industry. Our results show differences in 
effect size and significance levels for different operationalisations of TEU (See Table 3). However, in 
the mature ITO industry phase, Table 3 reports that the relationship between TEU and contract type is 
not significant for all five measures of TEU. 
In contrast, Lacity et al. (2011) argue that TCE may not be applicable to the ITO context because the 
assumptions underpinning TCE may not hold for client-vendor relationships in the ITO industry. The 
results presented in Table 2 show that, while the assumptions of vendor opportunism and information 
asymmetries between client and vendor may have held in the emerging phase of the ITO industry, they 
do not hold for the mature phase. 
Inspecting Table 2, industry maturity explains a significant share of the variance in the relationship 
between TEU and contract type. Furthermore, the effect of TEU on contract type in the mature ITO 
industry phase is not significant. Client learning, reducing the asymmetric knowledge between clients 
and vendors, and industry commoditisation, reducing TEU, combine to make the TCE analytical 
framework of limited importance to explain the choice of contract type in the mature phase of the ITO 
industry. 
Based on their competing explanations, Lacity et al. (2011) and Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) draw 
different conclusions about what do next. Lacity et al. (2011) conclude that ITO research should move 
beyond TCE and call for the development of an “endogenous” ITO theory. Karimi-Alaghehband et al. 
(2011) conclude that TCE should be applied more faithfully in future ITO research. Our results provide 
some support for both explanations. 
However, the implications of our findings for the effects of ITO industry maturity support Lacity et al.’s 
(2011) general conclusion for future research, as the ITO market is now maturing or is already mature. 
In addition, our findings are consistent with research conducted elsewhere on industry maturity (e.g., 
Agarwal et al., 2002; Argyres and Bigelow, 2007; Karniouchina et al., 2013; Misangyi et al., 2006; 
Suarez et al., 2013). In particular, studying the automotive industry, Argyres and Bigelow (2007) show 
that the effect of transaction misalignment on firm survival varies between maturity phases of the 
automotive industry. They conclude that the explanatory power of TCE depends on the maturity of an 
industry. Our results supporting Hypothesis 2 generalise their conclusions to the ITO industry. 
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It is interesting to speculate why the variance in findings reported by Lacity et al. (2011) and Karimi-
Alaghehband et al. (2011) have not been researched earlier. An inspection of the studies included in this 
meta-analysis suggests an explanation that should be further researched. We identified 29 studies that 
measure the correlation between contract type and TEU. However, only eight of these studies formally 
test this relationship. In the others, for example, contract type is used as a control or moderator when 
testing other relationships. 
Of the eight studies that test the relationship investigated here, seven were researched in the emerging 
phase and one in the mature phase. Of the former, six report supporting results and one reports not 
supporting results. The single study in the mature phase reports mixed results. It is possible that 
researchers internalised the effects of TCE-based hypotheses studied in the emerging phase. Then, 
developing extensions to that basic model during the more recent mature phase, researchers did not 
recognise the potential importance of null findings for the effects of their control variables. 
Finally, accepting the challenge proposed by Lacity et al. (2011), the critical question is: What would 
an “endogenous” ITO theory look like? It is hard to believe that ITO vendors, for example, IBM, would 
adopt shirking, for example, as part of their strategy. The reputation effects would be serious and 
potentially fatal (Dibbern et al., 2008). 
Instead, drawing on Hoberg et al. (2013), we propose that the new analytical framework should focus 
on client behaviour as the critical aspect. Variance in client behaviour to manage the client-vendor 
relationship is likely to be much larger than differences in vendor behaviour. Vendors have many more 
opportunities to learn by doing than do clients. This would fundamentally reframe the theory of ITO to 
be client behaviour-centric and not based on a model of a market in which major service organisations 
are assumed to defect on their contracts with their clients. 
6 Conclusion 
This study was motivated by the high variance in results reported in ITO research when TCE is adopted 
as the analytical framework. Informed by insights from the strategic management literature (Argyres 
and Bigelow, 2007) and recent market developments in the ITO industry, including increasing 
commoditisation, consolidation, and market transparency, we develop an explanation for these mixed 
results as a function of ITO industry maturity. 
The hypothesis is that the choice between FP contracts and TM contracts is contingent on industry 
maturity. The meta-analytic results show that contract type choice hypotheses derived from TCE are 
supported in the emerging phase of the ITO industry but not in the subsequent mature phase. Note that 
this study is not a test of the validity of the TCE theory. Rather, it is a test of whether the theory is 
relevant to explain the choice of contract type in the mature phase of the ITO industry. 
The contribution of this paper takes two forms. One contribution is to ITO research in which TCE is the 
dominant analytical framework. Two recent reviews provide competing explanations for the variance in 
research results with different implications for both practice and future research (Karimi-Alaghehband 
et al., 2011; Lacity et al., 2011). Our results allow us to partially reconcile the competing explanations, 
and to conclude that a TCE-based analytical framework is not relevant to ITO research post 2001. We 
propose that an “endogenous” ITO theory should focus on differences in client behaviour rather than on 
vendor behaviour. This would change the analytical framework from a vendor-centric to a client-centric 
model, and focus the practitioner on how the client leverages the vendor’s capabilities rather than 
protecting itself from potential vendor threats. 
The other contribution is to the industry maturity literature. Our results support the significance of 
industry maturity phases in that general debate. Past research focused on several relationships that may 
vary across phases in industry maturity, including antecedents of firm performance (Karniouchina et al., 
2013) and consequences of transaction misalignment for firm survival (Argyres and Bigelow, 2007). 
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This study extends the general maturity-based literature to research on governance decisions in buyer-
supplier relationships in the global ITO industry.  
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